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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1960
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER CLARK
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
The cases discussed in this review were decided between Jan-
uary 1, 1959 and January 1, 1960 and include only those of import-
ance. As can be seen by an inspection of the cases, this was not an
unusual year for this branch of the law. There were not many cases,
and none which announced new doctrine or startling departures
from accepted principles.
DIVORCE: PROCEDURE
One case' construed the statute 2 which formerly provided that
the court shall enter its decree dismissing the action within forty-
eight hours after the close of the trial, if it decides that the divorce
is to be denied. The contention was made in this case by the former
wife that when the court granted the divorce after the expiration
of more than forty-eight hours, this violated the statute and caused
the decree to be void for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
rejected this contention on two grounds, one that the "close of the
trial" did not occur until the court resolved the issues by its de-
cision, and two, that in any event the statute is directory and not
mandatory, so that its violation would not affect the validity of
the divorce. The case is of diminishing importance because this
provision of the statute has been eliminated by amendment.3
DIVORCE: PROPERTY, ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
The Supreme Court adhered again, in three cases, to its earlier
rule4 that the level of alimony and support payments, 5 and the
manner in which property is divided between spouses6 is largely
within the discretion of the trial court. If the trial court's orders
are supported by substantial competent evidence, they will not be
disturbed. It is surprising that so many appeals are taken in the
face of this well established principle.
The question of just when a property division should be de-
termined in a divorce action, one which has troubled the Supreme
Court in the past, arose again in. 1959. In McCoy v. McCoy 7 the
court held that there was no jurisdiction to hear and determine
property rights after the interlocutory decree, but before the
decree became final. The reasoning was that the statute author-
ized such a division "when a divorce has been granted,"" and the
divorce has not been granted until the decree is final. It is to be
hoped that the new statute which abolishes the interlocutory de-
1 Kemper v. Kemper, 344 P.2d 449 (Colo. 1959).
2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 71, § 1, at 440.
3 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37 1 8, at 224.
4 The leading Colorado case is Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662 (1955).
5 Brigham v. Brigham, 346 P.2d 30' (Colo. 1959).
6 Green v. Green, 342 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1959); Drake v. Drake, 138 Colo. 388, 333 P.2d 1038 (1959).
7 336 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1959).
8 Colo. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 65, 1 7, at 182.
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cree,9 and is more specific about the timing of the property
division,1 ° will end all doubt on this matter.
Two other procedural aspects of alimony also arose in 1959. In
Doll v. Doll" it was held that orders pertaining to alimony and
support money being in personam do not survive the death of
the husband. The case contains no discussion of the matter, which
is not at all as clear as seems to have been assumed, although there
is some earlier opinion in support of this view. 12 The other case 13
contains a dictum that accrued and unpaid installments of support
money cannot be forgiven, or in other words, that alimony or
support payments, once they accrue, cannot be modified. This
holding might be of some importance if it were attempted to en-
force such payments in other states, since if the Colorado Court
cannot modify them, then courts of other states are required to
enforce them under the full faith and credit clause.14
Three cases this year dealt with aspects of alimony and prop-
erty as affected by a separation agreement. The simplest of these
held that a valid separation agreement, not induced by fraud, in
which the wife relinquished all claim to the husband's property
prevented her from contesting his will.15 Cawley v. Cawley,16 the
9 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, §§ 7,8, at 224.
10 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, § 6, at 223.
11 345 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1959).
12 See International Trust Co. v. Liebhordt, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P.2d 264 (1943), and cases collected
in Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1955).
13 Gier v. Gier, 3 19 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1959).
14 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909).
15 Thomas v. Eaton, 138 Colo. 512, 335 P.2d 270 (1959).
16 340 P.2d 122 (Colo. 1959).
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second of these cases, held that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to adjudicate a division of property four and one-half months after
the divorce decree became final, when the decree was silent as to
property, even though the parties had a separation agreement
which divided their property. This case also was decided under the
pre-1958 divorce statute, but in all likelihood the result would be
the same under the new statute, since the new statute requires
that the property division occur "at some reasonable time there-
after as may be set by the court at the time of the issuance of said
divorce decree.' 7 In a specially concurring opinion in the Cawley
case Mr. Justice Frantz stated that in his view the petition for a
division of property had not come within a reasonable time. A
dictum in the Cawley case stated that there might be relief on the
agreement even though the petition in the divorce action was
denied.
The third case on separate agreements, Murphy v. Murphy,8
was an action by a wife against her husband to set aside a separa-
tion agreement by which she had released all claims to the hus-
band's property in return for his conveyance to her of cash and
property. She alleged that she had not been adequately advised or
represented, that she had been mentally ill at the time, and that
false representations had been made to her to induce her to give
the release. The separation, agreement had been attached to a di-
vorce decree obtained (uncontested) by the husband and incorpor-
ated therein by reference. As a defense the husband argued that
the agreement could not be attacked because its validity had been
adjudicated in the divorce action. The Supreme Court refused to
accept this argument and held that the agreement did not become
part of the decree because not set out verbatim in the decree, and
therefore it was open to attack for fraud. So far as this holding
goes it is correct, since earlier cases had established in Colorado
that incorporation by reference is not sufficient to make the agree-
ment part of the decree.19 The wife consequently was in the same
position as any person seeking to attack a contract for fraud. The
objection to the opinion in the Murphy case is its inarticulated
assumption that if the agreement had been incorporated and so
"merged" in the decree it would have been immune to attack for
fraud. This assumption is not supported by the authorities.20 Attack
on a decree for fraud is not "collateral" as the Supreme Court
seemed to think, but is and has for a long time been considered a
direct attack.21 The kinds of fraud for which a d e c r e e can be
attacked may very well include the type of which the wife was
complaining in this case, since it prevented her from litigating the
property division, and therefore was "extrinsic," in the old-
fashioned sense.22 Furthermore, under the new divorce statute it
is clear that a separation agreement may be incorporated in a
17 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37 § 6, at 223.
18 138 Colo. 516, 335 P.2d 280 (1959), thoroughly anolyz-L
4 
in 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 97 (1959).
19 McWilliams v. McWilliams, 110 Colo. 173, 132 P.2d 96 (1942).
20 Authorities on this are collected in Clark, Separation Agreements, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 320,
346 (1956).
21 1 Freeman, Judgments § 308 (5th ed. 1925).
22 Restatement, Judgments § 118, comment b (1942). See Jorgenson . Jorgenson, 32 Cal. 2d 13,
193 P.2d 728 (1948).
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divorce decree by reference.2 3 The Murphy case does not consider
this. Presumably the court was assuming that the new statute did
not apply. And finally, the former statute provided that no action
to attack a divorce decree could be brought after the expiration of
a year, except for lack of jurisdiction or for a fraud perpetrated on
the court,24 giving express legislative sanction for upsetting divorce
decrees on the ground of fraud. The court in the Murphy case does
not cite this statute which has now been repealed and replaced by
an even clearer provision.25 But for all these reasons, any inference
from the Murphy opinion that a separation agreement which is
merged in the divorce decree is immune to attack for the kind of
fraud asserted in that case is quite unwarranted.
At the very end of the year the court decided Allingham v.
Allingham,2 6 holding that a California judgment for arrears of
alimony would be enforced in Colorado. The defendant husband's
chief contention was that the order of the California court allow-
ing execution for the arrears, on which suit was brought in Colo-
rado, was obtained without notice to him and was therefore unen-
forcable under Griffin v. Griffin.2 7 In an eminently clear and well-
reasoned opinion, Mr. Justice Doyle disposed of this contention
by showing that the Griffin case was distinguishable. In the Griffin
case enforcement of a New York judgment for arrears of alimony
was asked, and the Supreme Court of the United States held that
since by New York law alimony was modifiable even as to accrued
installments (i.e., retroactively modifiable), due process required
an opportunity to the husband to be heard before a judgment could
be entered for the arrears. Mr. Justice Doyle cited several Cali-
fornia authorities to prove that California decrees are not retroac-
tively modifiable .2  Therefore the husband could not have raised
any defenses in California, and for that reason no notice to him was
necessary. The court also discussed and dealt with questions of in-
corporation of a separation agreement by reference, an oral agree-
ment of modification, and a claim for attorney's fees.
PARENT AND CHILD
The matter of child custody came before the Supreme Court
on several occasions during 1959, and the court reiterated the
established rule that the trial court's determination of custody will
be upheld when supported by substantial competent evidence, this
being a question within the trial court's sound discretion.29 The un-
usual thing about this year's cases is that three of them involved a
dispute between a natural parent and a grandparent over the cus-
tody of the child, and in all three an award of custody to the grand-
parent was upheld.30 This represents a sharp reversal of attitude
on the part of the Court, although of course one must always admit
23 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, § 6, at 223.
24 Colo. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 71, § 6, at 442.
25 Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 37, §§ 6, 9. The pertinent parts of section 6 read: "The court shall
retain iurisdiction of the action . . . far the purpose of hearing any matters . . . which it was unable
to determine at earlier hearings . . . because oF fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment."
26 12 Colo. Bar Assn. Adv. Sh. 226 (1959).
27227 U.S. 220 (1946).
28 12 Colo. Bar Assn. Adv. Sh. 226, at 228.29 (1959).
29 Harris v. Harris, 345 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1959).
30 Coulter v. Coulter, 347 P.2d 492 (Colo. 1959); Devlin v. Huffman, 339 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1959);
Walcott v. Walcott, 336 P.2d 298 (Colo. 1959).
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that no two custody cases involve identical facts, and therefore
stare decisis plays a limited role in such litigation. Nevertheless, in
the past in a line of cases reviewing decisions of j u v e n i I e and
county courts the Supreme Court had seemingly taken the position
that a natural parent would almost never be deprived of custody,
even after conduct which would seem to amount to abandonment
or neglect of the child.3' If the cases decided in 1959 do show
a greater willingness to give custody to persons other than natural
parents after neglect by such parents, and a greater willingness to
approve custody arrangements made by trial courts, this is a most
encouraging development. Matters of custody are certainly difficult
for appellate courts to determine on the basis of a paper record,
without the opportunity to see the child and the contesting parties,
and therefore, a very broad latitude should be given to the trial
courts.
A question of procedure in the modification of custody decrees
was settled in Pearson v. Pearson.'2 In that case the husband sought
a modification, but the wife had disappeared and c o u 1 d not be
served with notice of the hearing. Service was made on her former
attorneys in the divorce action, and the court held this was suf-
ficient under the Rules of Civil Procedure,'33 citing a similar Cali-
fornia case.'4 The Supreme Court then went on to hold that the
trial court should not have awarded custody to the husband solely
because the wife had failed to respect the visitation provisions of
the former decree, where the husband had no facilities for taking
care of the children, and had not even sought full custody.
Four c a s e s of contributory dependency this year concerned
paternity and its proof. Three of these involved merely the admis-
sion of evidence, its weight, and the form of instructions and there-
fore require no discussion here.35 One case, Vasquez v. Esquibel,
36
was of importance, however. It held that Lord Mansfield's rule,37 to
the effect that a spouse cannot testify to non-access in order to
prove a child illegitimate, is no longer to be followed in Colorado.
This holding was foreshadowed earlier by the case of Nulman v.
Cooper.3 The court f o u n d Lord Mansfield's rule outmoded and
archaic and therefore rejected it.
HUSBAND AND WIFE
The rule of the Vines39 case was reaffirmed by Morgan v. Mor-
gan 4 this year, which held that in a separate maintenance action
the wife can get support, but not a share of her husband's property.
The court in that case also held that a trust set up by the husband
could not be cancelled where the trustee was not a party to
the action, and that attorney fees could not be given to the wife for
31 Diernfeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238, 323 P.2d 628 (1958); Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421, 283
P.2d 162 (1955); Foxgruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511, 265 P.2d 233 (1954).
32 12 Colo. Bar Assn. Adv. Sh. 221 (1959).
33 Colo. R. Cir. P. 5 (b) (1).
34 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 21 Cal. 2d 580, 134 P.2d 251 (1943).
35 Medina v. Gonzales, 347 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1959); Briano v. Rubio, 347 P.2d 497 (Colo. 1959);
Angelopoulos v. Wise, 336 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1959).
36 346 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1959).
37 The history and background of the rule are discussed in Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband
and Wife, 10 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1947).
38 120 Colo. 98, 207 P.2d 814 (1949).
39 Vines v. Vines, 137 Colo. 449, 326 P.2d 662 (1958).
40 340 P.2d 1060 (Colo. 1959).
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the payment of counsel who had represented her in a divorce action
brought by the husband in Nevada. Counsel fees in the Nevada suit
were said to be a matter for the Nevada court to determine.
The principle that a property owner in Colorado may convey
his property without the consent or knowledge of his spouse was
adhered to in Will v. Mills. 41 The court said that the mere fact
that such a conveyance deprives the surviving spouse of the
chance to inherit does not make the conveyance invalid or
fraudulent.
Finally the troublesome factual question whether a man was
acting as agent for his wife in making an assignment of a mining
lease was determined in the affirmative in Broomhall v. Edgemont
Mining Co. 4 2 on the familiar principle that the agency of one spouse
for the other may be established by somewhat less convincing evi-
dence than would be required if the parties were not married to
each other.
41344 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1959).
42 340 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1959).
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